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Level 1 Microcircuits 
Level 1 microcircuits are defined as those currently qualified to 
MIL-PRF-38535 "lntegrated Circuits (Microcircuits) Manufacturing, General Specification 
for" as QML Class V or, 
MIL-M-38510 "Microcircuits, General Specification for" as QPL JAN Class S or, 
Space quality source control drawings (SCDs), where QMLIQPL does not exist, which 
meet all of the technical requirements of MIL-STD-883, Method 5004 and 5005 for a 
Class S device 
National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) QTS Class I 
Level 2 Microcircuits 
Level 2 microcircuits are defined as those currently qualified do 
MIL-PRF-38535 "lntegrated Circuits (Microcircuits) Manufacturing, General Specification 
for" as QML Class Q or, 
MIL-M-38510 "Microcircuits, General Specification for" as QPL JAN Class B, when 
modifiedlscreened per mission requirements for space 
National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) QTS Class II 
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EEE Parts Background 
EEE Parts Background 
- Parts have traditionally been viewed as the source of failure in 
spacecraft systems. 
- This was true for earlier parts because of quality and reliability 
.- .r ,*.,. . -  .a . L e d  
problems with evolving microelectronics. 
- 
' ' s.2 3-0 .". Recent data shows that parts and quality factors are the minor % a  ,*a, el..IU .$ ,. 
i.jy \ constituent of spacecraft failures. 7%- !, ; 
- In the 60's, MIL-STD-883 Quality and Reliability Assurance ---- ."...A .",, 
'd - 
. . 
procedures were developed for Monolithic Microcircuits. 
- In the 70's, additional mil specs were drafted to define requirements , , ," x?.,4.,z..v,, m ec: !e.
for "space-rated," or Class-S components. e 4  $ I  pi..  , ,, -,-,= : c I / 
2 b", i Screening effectively weeded out substandard components and t , td . --. \ ---. l-T. I.-:.-,- Jmu .A 
screening became a standard building block for spacecraft systems. I."s-  - , . . 
-1 - r 
- 80's & 90's - Electronics manufacturers heavily automated their 
processes to increase quality and reliability while decreasing cost for 
markets such as automotive, consumer electronics, and machine- 
tools. 
- Sarsfield, Liam, "The COSMOS on a Shoestring,", Santa Monica, CA, RAND MR-064-OSTP, 1998, pp. 119, 139 
s Requires the EEE Parts Engineer to understand the part 
application rather than just selecting parts from an approved 
parts list. 
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EEE Parts Background 
The Challenge 
Relative Size of Space Market for Microelectronics 
Military and 
Space grade 
parts do NOT 
dominate the 
component 
industry 
SBW~GE: LWTS and SM 
-2 
{The goal and fhe challenge for the space community is 
V" 
fo fake advantage of the availability and performance of 
commercial microelecfronics for space sysfems, while 
retaining sufficienf radiation folerance and reliabilify fo 
, insure mission success 
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Safety Factors 
Space environment, confined volume, human factors, and vacuum conditions 
require proper material selection 
- Out gassingloff gassing (NASA certified materials referenced in MAPTIS) 
Can contaminate critical components such as camera lenses 
- Flammability 
Spacecraft and human safety 
- Toxicity 
Critical because humans are in confined areas 
- Hermeticity 
Components exposed to vacuum can implode/explode without proper venting 
Components operate differently in vacuum - internal elements of non hermetic components can be 
affected 
Oil canning of the package 
- Thermal 
Traditional heating and cooling methods such as convection are not the same in 0-G as in gravity 
Air flow for cooling must now be forced airflow 
- Mechanical 
0-G imposes different mechanical challenges 
- Items such as traditional loose CD player trays will not function. The CD will float. 
- Ionizing Radiation 
Can latch-up a component or cause upsets disabling hardware 
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Process 
Five key steps to selecting Best-In-Class EEE Parts Manufacturers 
1. Definition of the application environment 
a Determine the EEE Part application environment 
e Understand design feature requirements 
2. Part identification and selection 
Close interaction between Design and Parts Engineering 
Determine the best technology type available for the application 
3. Identification and Qualification of manufacturers 
e General assessment and specific familyllina assessment 
e Vendors overall commitment to quality and reliability 
4. Validation of line and part capability to meet environmental requirements 
e Qualification results, NASA's GlDEP ALERTS 
5. Establish and maintain an ongoing relationship with with qualified 
manufacturers 
+:+ Requires an understanding of the Manufacturers and their processes 
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Manufacturing Standards 
Vary for COTS Hardware 
NASA Workmanship Standards List 
NASA-STD-8739.1 Workmanship Standard for Staking and Conformal Coating of 
Printed Wiring Boards and Electronic Assemblies 
NASA-STD-8739.2 NASA Workmanship Standard for Surface Mount Technology 
NASA-STD-8739.3 Soldered Electrical Connections 
NASA-STD-8739.4 Crimping, Interconnecting Cables, Harnesses, And Wiring 
NASA-STD-8739.5 Fiber Optic Terminations, Cable Assemblies, And Installation 
NASA-STD-8739.7 Electrostatic Discharge Control (Excluding Electrically 
Initiated Explosive Devices) 
NASA Technical Standards Program: htt~:llstandards.nasa.qov/ 
NASA Workmanship Technical Committee: 
http:llworkmanship.nasa.c~ovlhtm/index, html 
NASA-STD-8739.7 ESD is now superceded by ANSIIESD S20.20-1999 
a Other Standards such as J-STD-001, IPC6012 are under review 
Typically not used in manufacturing of COTS hardware 
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ndards for COTS 
I I P ~ D R ~ ~ ~ - - ~ I V ~ T  
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Workmanship standard certification to ISO, IPC, NASA-STDs etc. is 
no guarantee the vendor will produce high quality reliable 
hardware 
Key observation elements to focus on during a vendor survey 
- General appearance 
Appearance is an indication of the attitude of a company 
- Casual conversations with employees 
Listening to employees often reveals the pulse of the company 
- Excessive praise or constant complaints 
- Statistical Process Controls (SPC) 
Evidence of continuous process improvement and is it being used for CPI or just 
show 
- Dedicated touch-up personnel 
High employee number for dedicated touch-up often reveals a process problem 
- Mixture of flight and non flight hardware in the same area 
Often reveals a lack of discipline to ensure hardware pedigree 
- Equipment maintenance and calibration 
Is hardware close to end of calibration? Is the equipment clean or heavily used? 
Maintenance records for excessive down time could show process problems 
- Design for manufacturability process includes layout for automation 
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Workmanship 
Workmanship of hardware affects overall hardware reliability - good or bad 
Poor workmanship can introduce latent failures 
Cracked component seals due to improper component heating 
Corrosion from improper cleaning 
Corona as a result of icicles 
Fractured solderjoints causing intermittent failures 
Broken wires as a result of improper wire fastening and stress relief 
improper wire preparation 
. . -  . ' .., 
UNACCEPTABLE SOLDER SLIVERS GENERAL REQUIREMENTS WRAP ORIENTATION 
Solder slivers are an indication of improper Conductors may be wrapped clockwise (CW) or 
process control. counterclockwise (CCW) to the terminal, but the curvature 
NASA-STD-8739.3 [I 3.6.2.c.41 of dress shall be such that the wrap will tighten against 
the terminal if the conductor is pulled. 
Insufficient solder NASA-STD-8739.3 f9.1.81 
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Summaw 
It does not take a group of wizards to determine how to use 
COTS in non-critical space applications. 4". &? # ..- "T r. :? g,m 
I .. 8 I.?, $ " .@ F w M i t i u "  bidf 
w , g  - w - 
Approaches used for manned applications include limited 
items such as CD-players evaluated for safety to high 
criticality applications where the COTs hardware is 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis for the application 
and commensurate screening and qualification testing. 
COTS hardware is successfully implemented in both the International Space 
Station and Space Shuttle but requires evaluation and modifications for the 
application. 
Screening and qualification of COTs hardware used in critical applications may 
need to be more extensive and stringent than traditional military screening. 
Evaluation for 
9 Suitability for the application 
9 Safety 
9 Reliability and maintainability 
9 Workmanship 
